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Abstract
To be successful, cybercriminals must figure out how to scale their scams. They duplicate content on new websites,
often staying one step ahead of defenders that shut down past schemes. For some scams, such as phishing and
counterfeit goods shops, the duplicated content remains nearly identical. In others, such as advanced-fee fraud and
online Ponzi schemes, the criminal must alter content so that it appears different in order to evade detection by
victims and law enforcement. Nevertheless, similarities often remain, in terms of the website structure or content,
since making truly unique copies does not scale well. In this paper, we present a novel optimized combined clustering
method that links together replicated scamwebsites, even when the criminal has taken steps to hide connections. We
present automated methods to extract key website features, including rendered text, HTML structure, file structure,
and screenshots. We describe a process to automatically identify the best combination of such attributes to most
accurately cluster similar websites together. To demonstrate the method’s applicability to cybercrime, we evaluate its
performance against two collected datasets of scam websites: fake escrow services and high-yield investment
programs (HYIPs). We show that our method more accurately groups similar websites together than those existing
general-purpose consensus clustering methods.
Keywords: Clustering; Consensus clustering; Cybercrime; Escrow fraud; Hierarchical agglomerative clustering; HTML
feature extraction; HYIP fraud; Ponzi schemes; High-yield investment programs; Unsupervised learning; Image
similarity; Machine learning
1 Introduction
Cybercriminals have adopted two well-known strategies
for defrauding consumers online: large-scale and targeted
attacks. Many successful scams are designed for massive
scale. Phishing scams impersonate banks and online ser-
vice providers by the thousand, blasting out millions of
spam emails to lure a very small fraction of users to fake
websites under criminal control [1,2]. Miscreants ped-
dle counterfeit goods and pharmaceuticals, succeeding
despite very low conversion rates [3]. The criminals profit
because they can easily replicate content across domains,
despite efforts to quickly take down content hosted on
compromised websites [1]. Defenders have responded by
using machine learning techniques to automatically clas-
sify malicious websites [4] and to cluster website copies
together [5-8].
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Given the available countermeasures to untargeted
large-scale attacks, some cybercriminals have instead
focused on creating individualized attacks suited to their
target. Such attacks are much more difficult to detect
using automated methods, since the criminal typically
crafts bespoke communications. One key advantage of
such methods for criminals is that they are much harder
to detect until after the attack has already succeeded.
Yet these two approaches represent extremes among
available strategies to cybercriminals. In fact, many mis-
creants operate somewhere in between, carefully repli-
cating the logic of scams without completely copying all
material from prior iterations of the attack. For example,
criminals engaged in advanced-fee frauds may create bank
websites for non-existent banks, complete with online
banking services where the victim can log in to inspect
their ‘deposits’. When one fake bank is shut down, the
criminals create a new one that has been tweaked from the
former website. Similarly, criminals establish fake escrow
services as part of a larger advanced-fee fraud [9]. On the
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surface, the escrow websites look different, but they often
share similarities in page text or HTML structure. Yet
another example is online Ponzi schemes called high-yield
investment programs (HYIPs) [10]. The programs offer
outlandish interest rates to draw investors, which means
they inevitably collapse when new deposits dry up. The
perpetrators behind the scenes then create new programs
that often share similarities with earlier versions.
The designers of these scams have a strong incentive to
keep their new copies distinct from the old ones. Prospec-
tive victims may be scared away if they realize that an
older version of this website has been reported as fraud-
ulent. Hence, the criminals make a more concerted effort
to distinguish their new copies from the old ones.
While in principle the criminals could start all over
from scratch with each new scam, in practice, it is expen-
sive to recreate entirely new content repeatedly. Hence,
things that can be changed easily are (e.g., service name,
domain name, registration information). Website struc-
ture (if coming from a kit) or the text on a page (if the
criminal’s English or writing composition skills are weak)
are more costly to change, so only minor changes are
frequently made.
The purpose of this paper is to design, implement, and
evaluate a method for clustering these ‘logical copies’ of
scamwebsites. Section 2 gives a high-level overview of the
combined-clustering process. In Section 3, we describe
two sources of data on scam websites used for evalua-
tion: fake escrow websites and HYIPs. Next, Section 4
details how individual website features such as HTML
tags, website text, file structure, and image screenshots are
extracted to create pairwise distance matrices comparing
the similarity between websites. In Section 5, we outline
two optimized combined-clusteringmethods that takes all
website features into consideration in order to link dis-
parate websites together. We describe a novel method of
combining distance matrices by selecting the minimum
pairwise distance.We then evaluate themethod compared
to other approaches in the consensus clustering literature
and cybercrime literature to demonstrate its improved
accuracy in Section 6. In Section 7, we apply the method
to the entire fake escrow and HYIP datasets and analyze
the findings. We review related work in Section 8 and
conclude in Section 9.
2 Process for identifying replicated criminal
websites
This paper describes a general-purpose method for iden-
tifying replicated websites. Figure 1 provides a high-level
overview, which is now briefly described before each step
is discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
1. URL crawler: raw information on websites is
gathered.
2. URL feature extraction: complementary attributes
such as website text and HTML tags are extracted
from the raw data for each URL provided.
3. Input attribute feature files: extracted features for
each website are saved into individual feature files for
efficient pairwise distance calculation.
4. Distance matrices: pairwise distances between
websites for each attribute are computed using the
Jaccard distance metrics.
5. Individual clustering: hierarchical, agglomerative
clustering methods are calculated using each
distance matrix, rendering distinct clusterings for
each input attribute.
6. Combined matrices: combined distance matrices are
calculated using various individual distance matrix
combinations.
7. Ground truth selection: criminal websites are
manually divided into replication clusters and used as
a source of ground truth.
8. Cut height optimization: ground truth clusters are
used in combination with the Rand index to identify
the optimal clustering cut height for each input
attribute.
9. Combined clustering: hierarchical, agglomerative
clustering methods are calculated using each
combined distance matrix to arrive at any number of
multi-feature clusterings.
10. Top performer selection: the Rand index is
calculated for all clusterings against the ground truth
to identify the top performing individual feature or
combined feature set.
Step 1 is described in Section 3. Steps 2 and 3
are described in Section 4.1, while step 3 is described
in Section 4.2. Finally, the clustering steps (5-10) are
described in Section 5.
3 Data collectionmethodology
In order to demonstrate the generality of our clustering
approach, we collect datasets on two very different forms
of cybercrime: online Ponzi schemes known as HYIPs and
fake escrow websites. In both cases, we fetch the HTML
using wget. We followed links to a depth of 1, while
duplicating the website’s directory structure. All com-
munications were run through the anonymizing service
Tor [11].
3.1 Data source 1: online Ponzi schemes
We use the HYIP websites identified by Moore et al.
in [10]. HYIPs peddle dubious financial products that
promise unrealistically high returns on customer deposits
in the range of 1% to 2% interest, compounded daily.
HYIPs can afford to pay such generous returns by pay-
ing out existing depositors with funds obtained from new
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Figure 1 High-level diagram explaining how the method works.
customers. Thus, they meet the classic definition of a
Ponzi scheme. Because HYIPs routinely fail, a number
of ethically questionable entrepreneurs have spotted an
opportunity to track HYIPs and alert investors to when
they should withdraw money from schemes prior to col-
lapse. Moore et al. repeatedly crawled the websites listed
by theseHYIP aggregators, such as hyip.com, whomon-
itor for new HYIP websites as well as track those that
have failed. In all, we have identified 4,191 HYIP websites
operational between 7 November 2010 and 27 September
2012.
3.2 Data source 2: fake escrow websites
A long-running form of advanced-fee fraud is for crim-
inals to set up fraudulent escrow services [9] and dupe
consumers with attractively priced high-value items such
as cars and boats that cannot be paid for using credit
cards. After the sale, the fraudster directs the buyer to use
an escrow service chosen by the criminal, which is in fact
a shamwebsite. A number of volunteer groups track these
websites and attempt to shut the websites down by noti-
fying hosting providers and domain name registrars. We
identified reports from two leading sources of fake escrow
websites, aa419.org and escrow-fraud.com. We
used automated scripts to check for new reports daily.
When new websites are reported, we collect the rele-
vant HTML. In all, we have identified 1,216 fake escrow
websites reported between 07 January 2013 and 06 June
2013.
For both data sources, we expect that the crimi-
nals behind the schemes are frequently repeat offenders
Figure 2. As earlier schemes collapse or are shut down,
new websites emerge. However, while there is usually an
attempt to hide evidence of any link between the scam
websites, it may be possible to identify hidden similarities
by inspecting the structure of the HTML code and website
content. We next describe a process for identifying such
similarities.
4 Identifying and extractingwebsite features
We identified four primary features of websites as poten-
tial indicators of similarity: displayed text, HTML tags,
directory file names, and image screenshots. These are
described in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2, we explain
how the features are computed in a pairwise distance
matrix.
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Figure 2 Examples of replicated website content and file structures for the HYIP dataset.
4.1 Website features
4.1.1 Website text
To identify the text that renders on a given web page,
we used a custom ‘headless’ browser adapted from the
WatiN package for C# [12]. We extracted text from all
pages associated with a given website, then split the text
into sentences using the OpenNLP sentence breaker for
C#. Additional lower level text features were also extracted
such as character n-grams, word n-grams, and individ-
ual words for similarity benchmarking. All text features
were placed into individual bags by website. Bags for each
website were then compared to create pairwise distance
matrices for clustering.
4.1.2 HTML content
Given that cybercriminals frequently rely on kits with sim-
ilar underlying HTML structure [13], it is important to
check the underlying HTML files in addition to the ren-
dered text on the page. A number of choices exist, ranging
from comparing the document object model (DOM) tree
structure to treating tags on a page as a set of values.
From experimentation, we found that DOM trees were
too specific, so that even slight variations in otherwise
similar pages yielded different trees. We also found that
sets of tags did not work well, due to the limited vari-
ety of unique HTML tags. We found a middle way by
counting how often a tag was observed in the HTML
files.
All HTML tags in the website’s HTML files were
extracted, while noting how many times each tag occurs.
We then constructed a compound tag with the tag name
and its frequency. For example, if the ‘<br>’ tag occurs
12 times within the targeted HTML files, the extracted
feature value would be ‘<br>12’.
4.1.3 File structure
We examined the directory structure and file names for
each website since these could betray structural similarity,
even when the other content has changed. However, some
subtleties must be accounted for during the extraction of
this attribute. First, the directory structure is incorporated
into the file name (e.g., admin/home.html). Second,
since most websites include a home or main page given
the same name, such as index.htm, index.html, or
Default.aspx, websites comprised of only one file may
in fact be quite different. Consequently, we exclude the
common home page file names from consideration for all
websites. Unique file names were placed into bags by web-
site, and pairwise distances were calculated between all
websites under consideration.
4.1.4 Website screenshot images
Finally, screenshots were taken for each website using the
Selenium automated web browser for C# [14]. Images
were resized to 1, 000 × 1, 000 pixels. We calculated both
vertical and horizontal luminosity histograms for each
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image. Image luminosity features and similarity measures
were determined using the EyeOpen image library for
C# [15]. During image feature extraction, the red, green,
and blue channels for each image pixel were isolated to
estimate relative luminance, and these values were then
aggregated by each vertical and horizontal image pixel row
to calculate two luminosity histograms for each image.
4.2 Constructing distancematrices
For each input attribute, excluding images, we calcu-
lated both the Jaccard and Cosine distances between all
pairs of websites creating pairwise distance matrices for
each input attribute and distance measure. During evalu-
ation, it was determined that the Jaccard distance was the
most accurate metric for successfully identifying criminal
website replications.
The Jaccard distance between two sets S and T is
defined as 1 − J(S,T), where
J(S,T) = |S ∩ T||S ∪ T|
Consider comparing website similarity by sentences. If
websiteA has 50 sentences in the text of its web pages and
website B has 40 sentences, and they have 35 sentences in
common, then the Jaccard distance is 1 − J(A,B) = 1 −
35
65 = 0.46.
Website screenshot images were compared for both
vertical and horizontal similarity using luminosity his-
tograms. The luminosity histograms for each matched
image pair were compared for similarity by calculating the
weighted mean between both the vertical and horizontal
histograms. Next, both the average and maximum simi-
larity values between histograms were empirically evalu-
ated for clustering accuracy. Taking the average similarity
score between the vertical and horizontal histograms per-
formed best during our evaluation. Once the average
vertical and horizontal similarity score was determined,
then the pairwise image distance was calculated as 1 - the
pairwise image similarity.
Distance matrices were created in parallel for each
input attribute by ‘mapping’ website input attributes into
pairwise matches, and then simultaneously ‘reducing’
pairwise matches into distances using the appropriate dis-
tance metric. The pairwise distance matrices were chosen
as the output since they are the required input for the
hierarchical agglomerative clustering process used during
optimized clustering.
5 Optimized combined-clustering process
Once we have individual distance matrices for each
input attribute as described in the previous section, the
next step is to build the clusters. We first describe two
approaches for automatically selecting cut heights for
agglomerative clustering: dynamic cut height, which is
unsupervised, and optimized cut height, which is super-
vised. Next, we compute individual clusterings based on
each input attribute. Finally, we construct combined dis-
tance matrices for combinations of input attributes and
cluster based on the combined matrices.
5.1 Cluster cut height selection
We use a hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm
[16] to cluster the websites based on the distance matri-
ces. During HAC, a cut height parameter is required to
determine the dissimilarity threshold at which clusters are
allowed to be merged together. This parameter greatly
influences the clustering accuracy, as measured by the
Rand index, of the final clusters produced. For instance,
using a very high cut height or dissimilarity threshold
would result in most websites being included in one giant
cluster since a weak measure of similarity is enforced
during the merging process.
Traditionally, a static cut height is selected based on
the type of data being clustered. Because website input
attributes can have very different similarities and still be
related, we deploy two methods for automatically select-
ing the optimal cut heights, one unsupervised and one
supervised. In instances where no dependable source of
ground truth data is readily available, we use a dynamic
cut height based on the algorithm used as described
in [17]. While the dynamic cut height produces satisfac-
tory results when no ground truth information is available,
a better strategy is available where reliable sources of
ground truth are present.
Using optimized cut height, the best choice is found
using the Rand index as a performance measure for each
possible cut height parameter value from 0.01 to 0.99.
This approach performs clustering and subsequent Rand
index scoring at all possible dendrogram height cutoffs
using supervised cut height training on the ground truth
data. The resulting cut height selected represents the dis-
similarity threshold which produces the most accurate
clustering results against the ground truth data according
to the Rand index score. For example, fake escrow web-
site HTML tags produce clusterings with the Rand index
scores ranging from 0% to 97.9% accuracy while varying
only the cut height parameter. Figure 3 shows fake escrow
website HTML tags generating the highest Rand index
score of 0.979 at a cut height of 0.73 with the Rand index
score quickly descending back to 0 as the cut height is
increased from 0.73 to 1.00. Other fake escrow website
input attributes, such as sentences, file names, and images,
produce their highest Rand index scores at differing cut
height values (0.86, 0.67, and 0.29, respectively).
These results detailed in Section 6.2 demonstrate that
the optimized cut height approach produces more accu-
rate clusters than dynamic cut height selection, provided
that suitable ground truth data is available to find the
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Figure 3 Rand index values for each input attribute at various cut heights.
recommended heights. Furthermore, we also note that the
optimized cut height approach performs more consistently,
selecting the same top performing input attributes during
training and testing executions on both data populations.
5.2 Individual clustering
Because different categories of criminal activity may
betray their likenesses in different ways, we need a gen-
eral process that can select the best combination of input
attributes for each dataset. We cannot know, a priori,
which input attributes are most informative in reveal-
ing logical copies. Hence, we start by clustering on each
individual attribute independently, before combining the
input attributes as described below. It is indeed quite plau-
sible that a single attribute better identifies clusters than
does a combination. The clusters are selected using the
two cut-height methods outlined above.
5.3 Best min combined clustering
While individual features can often yield highly accurate
clustering results, different individual features or even
different combinations of multiple features may perform
better across different populations of criminal websites as
our results will show. Combining multiple distance matri-
ces into a single ‘merged’ matrix could be useful when
different input attributes are important.
However, combining orthogonal distance measures into
a single measure must necessarily be an information-lossy
operation. A number of other consensus-clustering meth-
ods have been proposed [18-21], yet as we will demon-
strate in the next section, these algorithms do not perform
well when linking together replicated scamwebsites, often
yielding less accurate results than clusterings based on
individual input attributes.
Consequently, we have developed a simple and, in prac-
tice, more accurate approach to combining the differ-
ent distance matrices. We define the pairwise distance
between two websites a and b as the minimum distance
across all input attributes. The rationale for doing so is
that a website may be very different across one measure
but similar according to another. Suppose a criminal man-
ages to change the textual content of many sentences on
a website, but uses the same underlying HTML code and
file structure. Using the minimum distance ensures that
these two websites are viewed as similar. Figure 2 demon-
strates examples of both replicated website content and
file structures. The highlighted text and file structures for
each website displayed are nearly identical. One could also
imagine circumstances in which the average or maximum
distance among input attributes was more appropriate.
We calculate those measures, too but found that the min-
imum approach worked best and so only those results are
reported.
We created combined distance matrices for all possi-
ble combinations of distance matrices. In the case of the
four input attributes considered in this paper, that means,
we produced 11 combined matrices (sentences and DOM
tags, sentences and file structures, sentences and images,
DOM tags and file structures, DOM tags and images,
file structure and images, sentences and DOM tags and
file structure, sentences and DOM tags and images, sen-
tences and file structures and images, DOM tags and
file structures and images, and sentences and DOM tags
and file structures and images). In situations where many
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additional features are used, several specifically targeted
feature combinations could also be identified for creating
a limited number of combined distance matrices.
Combined clusterings are computed for each combined
distance matrix using both cut-height selection meth-
ods. Ultimately, the top performing individual attribute or
combination is selected based on the accuracy observed
when evaluating the labeled training dataset.
6 Evaluation against ground truth data
One of the fundamental challenges of clustering logical
copies of criminal websites is the lack of ground truth
data for evaluating the accuracy of automated methods.
Some researchers have relied on expert judgment to assess
similarity, but most forego any systematic evaluation due
to a lack of ground truth (e.g., [22]). We now describe a
method for constructing ground truth datasets for sam-
ples of fake escrow services and high-yield investment
programs.
We developed a software tool to expedite the evalua-
tion process. This tool enabled pairwise comparison of
website screenshots and input attributes (i.e., website text
sentences, HTML tag sequences, and file structure) by an
evaluator.
6.1 Performing manual ground truth clusterings
After the individual clusterings were calculated for each
input attribute, websites could be sorted to identify man-
ual clustering candidates which were placed in the exact
same clusters for each individual input attribute’s auto-
mated clustering. Populations of websites placed into
the same clusters for all four input attributes were used
as a starting point in the identification of the manual
ground truth clusterings. These websites were then ana-
lyzed using the comparison tool in order to make a final
assessment of whether the website belonged to a clus-
ter. Multiple passes through the website populations were
performed in order to place them into the correct man-
ual ground truth clusters. When websites were identified
but did not belong in their original assigned cluster, these
sites were placed into the unassigned website population
for further review and other potential clustering opportu-
nities.
Deciding when to group together similar websites into
the same cluster is inherently subjective. We adopted a
broad definition of similarity, in which sites were grouped
together if they shared most, but not all, of their input
attributes in common. Furthermore, the similarity thresh-
old only had to be met for one input attribute. For
instance, HYIP websites are typically quite verbose. Many
such websites contain three or four identical paragraphs
of text, along with perhaps one or two additional para-
graphs of completely unique text. For the ground truth
evaluation, we deemed such websites to be in the same
cluster. Likewise, fake escrow service websites might
appear visually identical in basic structure for most of the
site. However, a few of the websites assigned to the same
cluster might contain extra web pages not present in the
others.
We note that while our approach does rely on individual
input attribute clusterings as a starting point for evalua-
tion, we do not consider the final combined clustering in
the evaluation. This is to maintain a degree of detachment
from the combined-clustering method ultimately used on
the datasets. We believe the manual clusterings identify
a majority of clusters with greater than two members.
Although the manual clusterings contain some clusters
including only two members, manual clustering efforts
were ended when no more clusters of greater than two
members were being identified.
6.2 Results
In total, we manually clustered 687 of the 4,188 HYIP
websites and 684 of the 1,220 fake escrow websites.
The manually clustered websites were sorted by the date
each website was identified, and then both datasets were
divided into training and testing populations of 80% and
20%, respectively. The test datasets represented 20% of
the most recent websites identified within both the fake
escrow services and HYIP datasets. Both datasets were
divided in this manner to effectively simulate the opti-
mized combined-clustering algorithm’s performance in a
real-world setting.
In such a scenario, ground truth data would be collected
for some period of time and used as training data. Once
the training dataset was complete, Rand index optimized
cut heights and top performing individual or combined
input attributes would be selected using the training data.
Going forward, the optimized cut heights would be used
during optimized combined-clustering to cluster all new
websites identified using the top performing individual or
combined input attribute matrices. Chronologically split-
ting the training and test data in this manner is consistent
with how we expect operators fighting cybercrime to use
the method.
We computed an adjusted Rand index [23] to evaluate
the combined-clustering method described in Section 5
against the constructed ground truth datasets using an
optimized cut height which was determined from the
training datasets. The optimized cut height was iden-
tified by empirically testing cut height values between
0.01 and 0.99 in increments of 0.01 against the training
data. Figure 3 illustrates the Rand index values by input
attribute at each of these intervals. The optimized Rand
index value selected is indicated by the dotted line on each
input attribute’s chart. Finally, the cut heights selected
during the training phase are used to perform optimized
combined clustering against the testing data to assess how
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this technique might perform in the real-world setting
previously described above. We also evaluated employ-
ing the unsupervised dynamic tree cut using the method
described in [17] to determine an appropriate cut height
along with other consensus-clustering methods for com-
parison. Rand index scores range from 0 to 1, where
a score of 1 indicates a perfect match between distinct
clusterings.
Table 1 shows the adjusted Rand index for both datasets
and all combinations of input attributes using the dynamic
and optimized-cut height combined-clustering methods.
The first four rows show the Rand index for each indi-
vidual clustering. For instance, for fake escrow services,
clustering based on HTML tags alone using a dynami-
cally determined cut height yielded a Rand index of 0.678
for the training population. Thus, clustering based on
tags alone is much more accurate than by website sen-
tences, file structure, or image similarity alone (Rand
indices of 0.107, 0.094, and 0.068, respectively). When
combining these input attributes, however, we see further
Table 1 Adjusted Rand index for different clusterings, varying the number of input attributes considered
(best-performing clusterings italicized)
Scamwebsites Dynamic cut height Optimized cut height
Test Train Test Train
Fake escrow services
Sentences 0.107 0.289 0.982 0.924
DOM tags 0.678 0.648 0.979 0.919
File names 0.094 0.235 0.972 0.869
Images 0.068 0.206 0.325 0.314
S and D 0.942 0.584 0.982 0.925
S and F 0.120 0.245 0.980 0.895
S and I 0.072 0.257 0.962 0.564
D and F 0.558 0.561 0.979 0.892
D and I 0.652 0.614 0.599 0.385
F and I 0.100 0.224 0.518 0.510
S and D and F 0.913 0.561 0.980 0.895
S and D and I 0.883 0.536 0.971 0.673
S and F and I 0.100 0.214 0.975 0.892
D and F and I 0.642 0.536 0.831 0.772
S and D and F and I 0.941 0.536 0.971 0.683
High-yield investment programs
Sentences 0.713 0.650 0.738 0.867
DOM tags 0.381 0.399 0.512 0.580
File names 0.261 0.299 0.254 0.337
Images 0.289 0.354 0.434 0.471
S and D 0.393 0.369 0.600 0.671
S and F 0.291 0.310 0.266 0.344
S and I 0.290 0.362 0.437 0.471
D and F 0.309 0.358 0.314 0.326
D and I 0.302 0.340 0.456 0.510
F and I 0.296 0.289 0.397 0.336
S and D and F 0.333 0.362 0.319 0.326
S and D and I 0.319 0.350 0.459 0.510
S and F and I 0.303 0.289 0.398 0.336
D and F and I 0.320 0.337 0.404 0.405
S and D and F and I 0.320 0.337 0.404 0.405
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improvement. Clustering based on taking the minimum
distance between websites according to HTML tags and
sentences yield a Rand index of 0.942, while taking the
minimum of all input attributes yields an adjusted Rand
index of 0.941. Both combined scores far exceed the Rand
indices for any of the other individual input attributes
using a dynamically determined cut height.
Results on the test population, for fake escrow services,
show that using the dynamic cut height method may not
always produce consistent performance results. While the
combined matrices achieve the highest Rand index dur-
ing training, individualHTML tags outperformed all other
input attributes by a large margin at 0.648 in the test
population.
The optimized cut height algorithm, however, consis-
tently demonstrates a more stable performance selecting
the individual sentences matrix and the combined sen-
tences and HTML tags matrix as the top performers in
both the training and test populations.
Because cybercriminals act differently when creating
logical copies of website for different types of scams, the
input attributes that are most similar can change. For
example, for HYIPs, we can see that clustering by website
sentences yields the most accurate individual Rand index,
instead of HTML tags as is the case for fake escrow ser-
vices. We can also see that for some scams, combining
input attributes does not yield a more accurate cluster-
ing. Clustering based on the minimum distance of all four
attributes yields a Rand index of 0.405 on the optimized
cut height’s test population, far worse than clustering
based on website sentences alone. This underscores the
importance of evaluating the individual distance scores
against the combined scores, since in some circumstances
an individual input attribute or a combination of a subset
of the attributes may fare better.
However, it is important to point out that the optimized
cut height algorithm appears to more consistently select
top performing input matrices and higher Rand index
scores on all of the data we benchmarked against. Rand
index scores dropped in both the fake escrow services and
HYIP test datasets using a dynamically determined cut
height (0.294 and 0.63, respectively). When using opti-
mized combined clustering, however, this decrease was
smaller in the fake escrow services test population at 0.057
while test results for the HYIP data actually improved
from 0.738 to 0.867 for an increase of 0.129% or 12.9%.
We used several general-purpose consensus-clustering
methods from R Clue package [24] as benchmarks against
the our ‘best min optimized-cut height’ approach:
1. ‘SE’ - implements ‘a fixed-point algorithm for
obtaining soft least squares Euclidean consensus
partitions’ by minimizing using Euclidean
dissimilarity [19,24].
2. ‘DWH’ - uses an extension of the greedy algorithm to
implement soft least squares Euclidean consensus
partitions [19,24].
3. ‘GV3’ - utilizes a sequential unconstrained
minimization technique (SUMT) algorithm which is
equivalent to finding the membership matrixm for
which the sum of the squared differences between
C(m) = mm′ and the weighted average
co-membership matrix
∑
b wbC(mb) of the
partitions is minimal [20,24].
4. ‘soft/symdiff’ - given a maximal number of classes,
uses an SUMT approach to minimize using
Manhattan dissimilarity of the co-membership
matrices coinciding with symdiff partition
dissimilarity in the case of hard partitions [21,24].
Table 2 summarizes the best performing measures
for the different combined- and consensus-clustering
approaches. We can see that our ‘best min optimized cut
height’ approach performs best. It yields more accurate
results than other general-purpose consensus-clustering
methods, as well as the custom clustering method used to
group spam-advertised websites by the authors of [6].
7 Examining the clustered criminal websites
We now apply the dynamic cut-height clustering methods
presented earlier to the entire fake escrow (considering
sentences, DOM tags, and file structure) and HYIP
datasets (considering sentences alone). The 4,191 HYIP
websites formed 864 clusters of at least size two, plus an
additional 530 singletons. The 1,216 fake escrow websites
observed between January and June 2013 formed 161
clusters of at least size two, plus seven singletons.
7.1 Evaluating cluster size
We first study the distribution of cluster size in the two
datasets. Figure 4(left panel) plots a CDF of the cluster
Table 2 The best performingmeasures for the different
combined and consensus-clusteringapproaches





Best min. 0.985 0.867
DISTATIS 0.070 0.563
Clue SE 0.128 0.245
Clue DWH 0.126 0.472
Clue GV3 0.562 0.508
Clue soft/symdiff 0.095 0.401
Click trajectories [6] 0.022 0.038
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Figure 4 Evaluating the distribution of cluster size in the escrow fraud and HYIP datasets. Cumulative distribution function of cluster size (left
panel). Rank order plot of cluster sizes (right panel).
size (note the logarithmic scale on the x-axis). We can see
from the blue dashed line that the HYIPs tend to have
smaller clusters. In addition to the 530 singletons (40% of
the total clusters), 662 clusters (47% of the total) include
between two and five websites. One hundred seventy-five
clusters (13%) are sized between six and ten websites, with
27 clusters including more than ten websites. The biggest
cluster included 20 HYIP websites. These results indicate
that duplication in HYIPs, while frequent, does not occur
on the same scale as many other forms of cybercrime.
There is more overt copying in the fake escrow dataset.
Only seven of the 1,216 escrowwebsites could not be clus-
tered with another website. Eighty clusters (28% of the
total) include between two and five websites, but another
79 clusters are sized between six and 20. Furthermore,
two large clusters (including 113 and 109 websites, respec-
tively) can be found. We conclude that duplication is used
more often as a criminal tactic in the fake escrow websites
than for the HYIPs.
Another way to look at the distribution of cluster sizes
is to examine the rank-order plot in Figure 4(right panel).
Again, we can observe differences in the structure of the
two datasets. Rank-order plots sort the clusters by size
and show the percentages of websites that are covered by
the smallest number of clusters. For instance, we can see
from the red solid line the effect of the two large clusters
in the fake escrow dataset. These two clusters account for
nearly 20% of the total fake escrowwebsites.After that, the
next biggest clusters make a much smaller contribution in
identifying more websites. Nonetheless, the incremental
contributions of the HYIP clusters (shown in the dashed
blue line) are also quite small. This relative dispersion
of clusters differs from the concentration found in other
cybercrime datasets where there is large-scale replication
of content.
7.2 Evaluating cluster persistence
We now study how frequently the replicated criminal
websites are re-used over time. One strategy available to
criminals is to create multiple copies of the website in
parallel, thereby reaching more victims more quickly. The
alternative is to re-use copies in a serial fashion, intro-
ducing new copies only after time has passed or the prior
instances have collapsed. We investigate both datasets
to empirically answer the question of which strategy is
preferred.
Figure 5 groups the ten largest clusters from the fake
escrow dataset and plots the date at which each web-
site in the cluster first appears. We can see that for
the two largest clusters there are spikes where multi-
ple website copies are spawned on the same day. For
the smaller clusters, however, we see that websites are
introduced sequentially. Moreover, for all of the biggest
clusters, new copies are introduced throughout the
observation period. From this, we can conclude that crim-
inals are likely to use the same template repeatedly until
stopped.
Next, we examine the observed persistence of the clus-
ters.We define the ‘lifetime’ of a cluster as the difference in
days between the first and the last appearance of a website
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Figure 5 Top ten largest clusters in the fake escrow dataset by date the websites are identified.
in the cluster. For instance, the first reported website in
one cluster of 18 fake escrow websites appeared on 2
February 2013, while the last one occurred on 7May 2013.
Hence, the lifetime of the cluster is 92 days. Longer-lived
clusters indicate that cybercriminals can create website
copies for long periods of time with impunity.
We use a survival probability plot to examine the dis-
tribution of cluster lifetimes. A survival function S(t)
measures the probability that a cluster’s lifetime is greater
than time t. Survival analysis takes into account ‘censored’
data points, i.e., when the final website in the cluster is
reported near the end of the study. We deem any clus-
ter with a website reported within 14 days of the end of
data collection to be censored. We use the Kaplan-Meier
estimator [25] to calculate a survival function.
Figure 6 gives the survival plots for both datasets (solid
lines indicate the survival probability, while dashed lines
indicate 95% confidence intervals). In the left graph, we
can see that around 75% of fake escrow clusters persist for
at least 60 days, and that the median lifetime is 90 days.
Note that around 25% of the clusters remained active at
the end of the 150-day measurement period, so we cannot
reason about how long these most persistent clusters will
remain.
Because we tracked HYIPs for a much longer period
(Figure 6 (right)), nearly all clusters eventually ceased to
be replicated. Consequently, the survival probability for
even long-lived clusters can be evaluated. Twenty per-
cent of the HYIP clusters persist for more than 500 days,
while 25% do not last longer than 100 days. The median
lifetime of HYIP clusters is around 250 days. The rel-
atively long persistence of many HYIP clusters should
give law enforcement some encouragement: because the
criminals reuse content over long periods, tracking them
down becomes a more realistic proposition.
8 Related work
A number of researchers have applied machine learning
methods to cluster websites created by cybercriminals.
Wardman et al. examined the file structure and content
of suspected phishing web pages to automatically classify
reported URLs as phishing [7]. Layton et al. cluster phish-
ing web pages together using a combination of k-means
and agglomerative clustering [8].
Several researchers have classified and clustered web
spam pages. Urvoy et al. use HTML structure to classify
web pages, and they develop a clustering method using
locality-sensitive hashing to cluster similar spam pages
together [26]. Lin uses HTML tag multisets to classify
cloaked web pages [27]. Lin’s technique is used by Wang
et al. [28] to detect when the cached HTML is very differ-
ent from what is presented to the user. Finally, Anderson
et al. use image shingling to cluster screenshots of web-
sites advertised in email spam [5]. Similarly, Levchenko
et al. use a custom clustering heuristic method to group
similar spam-advertised web pages [6]. We implemented
and evaluated this clustering method on the cybercrime
datasets in Section 6. Der et al. clustered storefronts sell-
ing counterfeit goods by the affiliate structure driving traf-
fic to different stores [29]. Finally, Leontiadis et al. group
similar unlicensed online pharmacy inventories [22]. They
did not attempt to evaluate against ground truth; instead
they used the Jaccard distance and agglomerative cluster-
ing to find suitable clusters.
Neisius and Clayton also studied high-yield investment
programs [13]. Notably, they estimated that a majority
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Figure 6 Survival probability of fake escrow clusters (left) and HYIP clusters (right).
of HYIP websites used templates licensed from a com-
pany called ‘Goldcoders’. While we did observe some
Goldcoder templates in our own datasets, we did not find
them occurring at the same frequency. Furthermore, our
clustering method tended to link HYIP websites more by
the rendered text on the page rather than the website file
structure.
Separate to the work on cybercriminal datasets, other
researchers have proposed consensus clustering methods
for different applications. DISTATIS is an adaptation of
the STATIS methodology specifically used for the pur-
pose of integrating distance matrices for different input
attributes [30]. DISTATIS can be considered a three-way
extension of metric multidimensional scaling [31], which
transforms a collection of distance matrices into cross-
product matrices used in the cross-product approach
to STATIS. Consensus can be performed between two
or more distance matrices by using DISTATIS and
then converting the cross-product matrix output into
into a (squared) Euclidean distance matrix which is
the inverse transformation of metric multidimensional
scaling [32].
Our work follows in the line of both of the above
research thrusts. It differs in that it considers multi-
ple attributes that an attacker may change (site content,
HTML structure, and file structure), even when she may
not modify all attributes. It is also tolerant of greater
changes by the cybercriminal than previous approaches.
At the same time, though, it is more specific than general
consensus clustering methods, which enables the method
to achieve higher accuracy in cluster labelings.
9 Conclusions
When designing scams, cybercriminals face trade-offs
between scale and victim susceptibility and between scale
and evasiveness from law enforcement. Large-scale scams
cast a wider net, but this comes at the expense of lower
victim yield and faster defender response. Highly targeted
attacks are much more likely to work, but they are more
expensive to craft. Some frauds lie in the middle, where
the criminals replicate scams but not without taking care
to give the appearance that each attack is distinct.
In this paper, we propose and evaluate a combined-
clustering method to automatically link together such
semi-automated scams. We have shown it to be
more accurate than general-purpose consensus-clustering
approaches, as well as approaches designed for large-scale
scams such as phishing that use more extensive copying
of content. In particular, we applied the method to two
classes of scams: HYIPs and fake escrow websites.
The method could prove valuable to law enforcement,
as it helps tackle cybercrimes that individually are too
minor to investigate but collectively may cross a thresh-
old of significance. For instance, our method identifies
two distinct clusters of more than 100 fake escrow web-
sites each. Furthermore, our method could substantially
reduce the workload for investigators as they prioritize
which criminals to investigate.
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